B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE
, concludes with these observations: "For providing us a picture of the internal workings of the Supreme Court in recent history, including the scandals of Watergate, this book is invaluable. That the picture is one of bickering old men deciding great issues with hidden motives, this book is depressing." UPI Wire Service, assurance of confidentiality to our sources was necessary to secure their cooperation. 3 Without such cooperation The Brethren could not have been written. The authors therefore scrupulously refrain from revealing the names of the many sources upon whom they relied. But they do characterize the sources, and what they got from them, in this way:
The sources who helped us were persons of remarkable intelligence.
They had unusually precise recall about the handling of cases that came before the Court, particularly the important ones. However, the core documentation for this book came from unpublished material that was made available to us by dozens of sources who had access to the documents. We obtained internal memoranda between Justices, letters, notes taken at conference, case assignment sheets, diaries, unpublished drafts of opinions and, in several instances, drafts that were never circulated even to the other Justices. By the time we had concluded our research, we had filled eight file drawers with thousands of pages of documents from the chambers of eleven of the twelve Justices who served during the period 1969 to 1976. 4 I anticipate much of what I have to say here by observing that the "Authors' Note" at the front of this book includes an acknowledgement to a named colleague of the authors on the The Washington Post, of whom it is said, "A devoted and resourceful assistant, no one could have been more loyal and trusted." No doubt, the authors would condemn the people they rely upon to preserve the confidentiality they require for their work if they were to learn that another investigative reporter had managed to secure access to their "eight file drawers" and to what their associates know about their more than two hundred sources. Yet, are these authors entitled to any more fidelity from their employees and associates than the Justices of the Supreme Court expected from theirs? Or, as Macbeth put it, as he contemplated the betrayal of his king in order to secure the throne for himself, " [W] e but teach Bloody instructions, which, being taught, return to Plague th' inventor. ' 5 Or, as Justice Holmes once said of wiretapping, this is "dirty 3. THE BRETHREN, supra note 1, at 3-4.
4. Id at 4; cf. Meltsner, Book Review, NATION, Feb. 2, 1980, at 117: I believe Woodward when he says there was no way to get the story except by holding interviews "on background" and checking and cross-checking recollections and documentary evidence. But the reader is treated unfairly, asked to put total trust in the authors and never reminded that their sources might be settling scores, speaking rumor as fact, engaging in self-aggrandizement, or simply not in a position to know. Rarely are we presented with conflicting evidence of the same event. business." ' 6 But, then, even wiretapping can be justified on some occasions. If wiretapping can be justified, why should we not condone what these and other journalists do in the interest of helping us become as well informed as a sovereign citizen body should be?
We are obliged, then, to consider what it means to be "well informed" and how one goes about becoming so. Consider, for example, the New Hampshire "debate" among Republican candidates for President that was broadcast February 20, 1980. A half-dozen men spent an hour and a half broadcasting to the electorate a series of one-minute answers to the great questions of the day! How seriously should we take problems that are dealt with thus? How seriously should we take men, or the system of producing and presenting them, that approach important issues thus? That such encounters can be regarded as "debates" reflects the poverty both of our imagination and of our recollections. It should not take much imagination for us to appreciate that much more than this, and something much different from this, is required for serious thinking. And we should recall what we have learned about genuine debates, such as those between Abraham Lincoln and Stephen A. Douglas in Illinois more than a century ago. 7 Some people would say we can no longer have extended, searching public examinations of the issues of the day. But this is only to say that we are trapped by our technology and by the techniques and way of life Several reviewers comment upon the assurances of confidentiality that journalists rely upon. See Neier, Book Review, Nation, Feb. 2, 1980, at 120 ("Funny, isn't it, that many journalists attach great significance to protecting the confidentiality of their sources but think nothing of getting their sources to violate other people's confidences."); infra note 30; see also Private chats, publicpress, Chi. Sun-Times, Feb. 22, 1982 , at 25, col. I (in which editorial reservations are expressed about publication by the Washington Post of notes made during staff meetings of the Secretary of State); infra note 44.
6. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis warned on that occasion, "The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding." Id at 479.
It has been reported that Chief Justice Burger "once said that talking to a Justice's clerk was like tapping his phone." TIME, Dec. 17, 1979 , at 79; see infra notes 24 and 29; cf. W. SHAKE-SPEARE, KING LEAR, IV, vi, 252-257 (The Complete Pelican Shakespeare edition (1969)).
7. The Lincoln-Douglas debates were organized by the participants. And, of course, those participants were quite capable of putting searching questions to each other without the aid of journalists.
Extended debates, with instructive inquiry into and reflection upon the available evidence, may still be heard from time to time in the closing arguments of counsel to a jury. generated by that technology. It is also to say that we can no longer appreciate what we are missing: if we did recognize how superficial our public discourse has become, we would surely try to do something about it or, at least, we would be put on notice that whatever is produced by such discourse is probably inadequate. 8 In any event, we should constantly remind ourselves that our cherished freedom of speech is primarily for the purpose of permitting civic-minded citizens to discuss the issues of the day at length and without fear of governmental reprisal. 9 It is inevitable, human nature being what it is, that this freedom will be abused from time to time. We are obliged to put up with such abuses in order to preserve vigorous public discourse. We should also recognize that much depends upon the good sense and the self-restraint of those who use freedom of speech to bring to our attention things we should know. The single debate between the Democratic and the Republican candidates for President in 1980 was also conducted pursuant to an arrangement that could hardly be expected to promote thoughtfulness:
In the first part, each panelist will put one question to each candidate. Candidates have two minutes to respond. Panelists will ask a follow-up question, which candidates will have one minute to answer. Candidates will have one minute for rebuttal. In the second segment, each candidate again will have two minutes to respond to questions from the panelists. There will be one-minute rebuttals, then each candidate will have one minute to answer his opponent's rebuttal. Each candidate will have three minutes for a closing statement.
Chi. Tribune, Oct. 26, 1980, § 2, at 12, col. 5.
The televised debate of January 15, 1984 among eight major candidates for the Democratic presidential nomination was somewhat better organized than the 1980 debates-even though we still have a long way to go to achieve a genuine discussion of issues on such occasions. say, only the conspiratorial is real; or, at least, it is an exposure of the conspiratorial that is most revealing. 10 A secret is considered significant because it is secret. It is not recognized that certain things may be kept secret precisely because that which is not secret (but rather is published for all to see) could not be as good as it should be if all deliberations leading to it were known to be subject to periodic and inevitably selective exposure. Thus, as one constitutional scholar has observed, judges, if they are to do their work responsibly, must have the "freedom to wrangle with each other."'I To make such wrangling public, or to make it uncertain whether or not it will be made public, would tend to discourage frankness and flexibility. Certainly, it is far from clear that there is anything improper or sinister in conducting judicial deliberations in private-which is, after all, the way that has been generally accepted among us for two hundred years. Anyone who has served on a jury; who has confided in his parent, his spouse, or his child; or who has consulted a priest, a psychiatrist, or a lawyer can appreciate how critical an assurance of enduring confidentiality can be.
The tendency of journalists, when they become more interested in hidden motives than in public arguments (which arguments, in the form of opinions, appellate judges are primarily engaged in developing), is to make a great deal of gossip, if only because that is something they can add to what is routinely provided to the public by courts and legal commentators. This journalistic version of "legal realism" tends to lead to an undue regard for the seamy side of life, to an eager exposure to public view of the things that sensitive people have always been reluctant to publicize. Not only are the quirks of personalities made a good deal of-with the implication that one learns something significant about a man when one learns about his peculiarities-but also the afflictions we are all subject to are feasted upon. The most shocking instance of this in The Brethren is the extended account of the effects, both physical and psychological, of a debilitating stroke upon a 10. Is this indicated also by the title itself, The Brethren? See PLATO, LAWs, 908A, 908E-909A, 951C-953D, 961A-962E, 968A. On the status of politics among all too many intellectuals today, see infra note 21.
11. Kurland, Book Review, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 185, 189 (1979) ("Indeed, maintaining the Justices' freedom to wrangle with each other over matters for which easy and unanimous answers should not usually be expected is the real and adequate justification for the privacy of the conference room and the chambers."); see infra note 21.
Walter F. Murphy reported, in the course of a panel discussion of The Brethren at the American Political Science Association Convention in Washington, D.C., on August 29, 1980, that a Justice of the Supreme Court had told him, "If we were not fighting with each other, we should be impeached." (I attended this panel discussion. Several times in these footnotes I draw upon the notes I made on that public occasion.) See also Henry, Book Review, 47 TENN. L. REV. 495, 498 (1980) . respected Justice who had served long and honorably. The details were not necessary in order to make a legitimate point-that the Court, as it had done before on several occasions, adjusted its mode of operation in the expectation that this Justice would soon be replaced. But much more than this is said, probably because it had become available and could be counted upon to appeal to an insensitive curiosity among readers.' 2 What is particularly significant here is not that ambitious journalists should want to exploit such material, but that respectable publishers and editors encourage and permit them to do so.
The The least that can be said against the authors of The Brethren with respect to their Moore account is that they were not justified, on the basis of the evidence they were willing to present, to bring the charge they did against Justice Brennan. The most that can be said against them here is perhaps summed up in the concluding observation by the law clerk who had been interviewed by the authors on the record and who may have been the principal source (directly or indirectly) for The Brethren's report of the episode:
Woodward published a false story about Justice Brennan, and he cannot back it up. If he has any integrity, he should straightforwardly admit that his story is false and retract it. His continuing failure to do so can only demonstrate the length to which he will go in pursuit of financial gain and personal aggrandizement. We do not need exposes to show us that judges are "human," especially since such exposes are apt to capitalize upon the questionable.
To right the balance, and to confirm that judges are human, I will share with my readers still another "inside" story about what judges can be like. This story, too, is about Justice Brennan. A law school teacher of mine, the late Harry Kalven, once told me about a bar association meeting he was to address. When he got to the reception held before he was to speak, he found to his dismay that all of the lawyers there were dressed in formal wear; he alone was in an ordinary business suit. His discomfort grew as he mingled with his audience, for they were indeed dressed most elegantly. As he circulated about the hall he came upon a group that was obviously gathered around someone of importance; he figured that that someone must be the other guest speaker, who was, on that occasion, Justice Brennan. Sure enough, when Mr. Thus, I have had occasion to say about a Justice's opinion for the Court: "The thing that strikes me most about the Harlan opinion is that it is simply unlawyerlike. He just had the votes and that was it; he didn't have to have the argument." Anastaplo, CH. LAW., April 2, 1979, at 15; see also Anastaplo, supra note 14, at 992-93 n.23, 1008 n.45; Letter to the Editor, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 12, 1983, at 12.
Consider as well, Fletcher, Book Review, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 168, 171 (1980) ("I do not argue that the Court should be free from criticism-quite the contrary. But criticism that proceeds from ignorance must inevitably be gratuitous.") Mr. Fletcher notices that a respected fellow journalist was (naturally?) permitted by the authors to deny an alleged impropriety on his part. Id at 176; see THE BRETiREN, supra note 1, at 148-49.
In any event, The Brethren does not contain any allegations of the kind of possible judicial impropriety examined in Danelski, Brandeis and Frankfurter, 96 HARV. L. Rv. 312 (1982) . Indeed, there is in The Brethren reassuringly little that is discreditable to the Court (in the ordinarily "newsworthy" sense).
and confidentiality if certain kinds of deliberations are to be effective. Important issues are at stake in judicial deliberations, and conscientious men will make all kinds of efforts to persuade one another. They can, and do, say all kinds of things, especially "in the heat of battle," which they and their more mature associates are aware they do not mean, and which they certainly do not mean to have recorded for posterity. Any good novel on this subject can remind us, at least as well as The Brethren does, that judges can and should act like human beings. Perhaps one balanced behind-the-scenes account of how the Supreme Court does operate can be useful every quarter-century or so, but a balanced account would be one that recognizes that judges usually have more good things than bad to say about their colleagues. It is the cutting remark about a colleague, however, that the journalist tends to treasure; it is that which is "news." Virtually nothing is said in The Brethren about the social relations, outside the Court building, among the Justices or between the Justices and their friends.' 8 Thus, remarks uttered in the midst of struggle are not balanced by reflective assessments made at the Justices' leisure.
Personal relationships aside, one would have to know much more than these authors do about the final products of the Court's deliberations to be able to describe and assess sensibly how and why the Justices developed their public positions. Reliance upon stray quotations and an occasional early draft of an opinion is likely to be misleading unless one knows a good deal about the context. Similarly, it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine a good teacher's position on a serious question from the things a student may happen to remember about what is said in a lively class discussion. But this is, in effect, what the authors have attempted to do by questioning former law clerks about their conversations with Justices. Certainly, it is difficult to understand a continuing give-and-take process from the outside, as anyone who has tried to counsel others about their family relations knows.
The Court's published opinions are what matter. Most opinions are critical more for what the Court said in them, than for who lined up behind them and how the lineup was achieved. Often, the writer of an opinion does not matter, whatever pride of authorship particular judges may have. Certainly, the opinions themselves, rather than the recollections journalists may happen to piece together about how those opinions came to be, are more important for permitting us to understand what has happened and for giving everyone, including the Justices Revelations of the sort found in The Brethren, however realistic they may seem, do not address the serious questions one might have; indeed, they are likely to distract one from them. Such revelations are like the television news broadcasts that give people the illusion, much more so than do newspaper accounts, that they now know enough to understand what is going on, when in fact the viewers might know far less than they did when "all" they did was read books and journals or simply rely for their opinions upon those who did read. I do not mean to suggest that individual Justices never leave their mark on Supreme Court doctrines. Consider, for example, the mischievous effects of Justice Holmes's beguiling "clear and England, whither he intended soon to enter upon a money-making legal practice. McLean was then the ambitious fanatic but Curtis the baser of the two, since he acted rather from avarice. All such speculations concerning motives are pure conjecture and tell us more about Hodder than about the judges. Similarly, one suspects that contemporary speculations tell us more about legal realists (whether in journalism or elsewhere) than about the judges investigated.
A study of what Chief Justice Taney or Justice Holmes did say and how they were responded to in public should be far more significant than any "inside information" about how or why they happened to say what they did in Dred Scott or in Schenck. On the other hand, a lively effort to exploit a "pedagogy of persons" may be seen in the work of Professor Paul R. Baier, of the Louisiana State University Law Center.
In any event, far more instructive and entertaining than anything in The Brethren is the account of the consequences of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) For a discourse on how legitimate confidences should be kept, see A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DE-MOCRACY IN AMERICA 20 ("I noted down all such confidences as soon as I heard them, but they will never leave my notebooks; I would rather let my comments suffer than add my name to the list of those travelers who repay generous hospitality with worries and embarrassments.").
Black The authors were aware of such sentiments, sentiments which suggest that a law clerk should respect confidentiality at the very least during the tenure of his Justice's colleagues. Yet, they went ahead with their exposes. Did they think about what they had written? What did these clerks know that judges like Hugo L. Black, and generations of lawyers, did not know? Or, should we ask, what had they forgotten about the conditions and consequences of civility that their predecessors had respected?
Critical to an understanding of The Brethren is a recognition of the authors' animus toward Chief Justice Burger. The book is largely about him and the way he handles, or tries to handle, the Court. I do not believe that the authors appreciate the extent to which the book is subordinated to their attack upon the Chief Justice.
Chief Justice Burger is, no doubt, an easy target. One does not need The Brethren and its methods, however, to become aware of the impression he all too often makes on his associates. All one needs to do is to talk to lawyers who have had dealings with him at bar association meetings. The book is, therefore, more a critique of the Burger personality than it is a study of the work of the Court. We see the issues and controversies as they develop around the Chief Justice, who has, besides his own perhaps insecure personality, two other things working against him: he was appointed by Mr. Nixon, whose doings have all become suspect; and he followed a Chief Justice who had the magic political touch. The This unwholesome alumni association is now practicing law and, in accordance with the strange ethic of its profession, proving that any gangster with a fee can trust its members with his large secrets after having already proved that no judge they served could trust them with his small ones. [Justice Douglas's] papers relating to his work on the Court, including his records on case conferences and personal correspondence and notes, are being turned over to the Library of Congress, where they will be sealed for five years and then opened to the public. Other papers, up to the year 1958, are already catalogued at the library and were opened to the public upon his death. See also supra note 24.
Consider, further, on the duty the Justices owe one another, the following observation by Mr.
Frank-
In an important sense, the die was cast when Alexander Bickel "If any department employee leaks confidential information from an investigation, if found, he or she will lose their position," Civiletti said. "If not found, at least that employee will lose honor and self-respect." He told the employees that leaks jeopardize the investigations the department is conducting; run the risk of harm to informants, witnesses and department employees; jeopardize the right to a fair trial, and sometimes wound innocent people.
He said the blame for leaks could not be placed on news reporters. He said reporters' appeals to department employees for such information are "proper," although those appeals may be based on an effort to capitalize on the employee's fear, pride, envy, anger or patriotism. Chi. Sun-Times, Mar. 6, 1980, at 22, col. 1; see Fletcher, Book Review, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 168, 169 (1980); see also infra note 30.
30. Mr. Armstrong, in the course of the panel discussion referred to in notes 11 and 12, supra, insisted that the authors had talked at length with a majority of the Justices-that is, he argued, the book is not written just from a clerk's-eye view. He also said that many documents were relied upon, not just recollections, and that the clerks were used primarily as sources for the Justices' opinions, not for what the clerks themselves thought. Indeed, he reported, the Justices would refer an interviewer to a clerk for more precise information (since the terms run together for the Justices much more than they do for the transient clerks).
The way Mr. Armstrong presents all this makes it sound rather innocent on the part of the clerks. No doubt, the common good could well call for a breach of faith in some instances-but, in such an instance, any author promoting and profiting from the breach of faith should be able to make aprimafacie case for the proposition that the common good did, in fact, require a subversion of the tradition of non-disclosure. The old-fashioned approach to these matters may be seen in the account of the lawyer who served as clerk to Justice Black in 1942. His Justice encouraged candor from his clerks and, it seems, he got it. "At the same time," this lawyer recalls, "I was categorically instructed, and obeyed the instructions rigidly, that discussion stopped at the threshold to the office. From the corridor to the world over, there was one spokesman, and that was my justice. I thought that view wise, obeyed it rigidly, and still think so." Frank, supra note 29, at 164; see also Rehnquist, The First Amendment: Freedom, Philosophy, and the Law, 12 GONZ. L. REv. I, 13-14 (1976).
twenties-and what do they really know anyhow? How can such youngsters properly assess the moral and political, as well as the strictly legal and constitutional, issues confronting the Justices? What such youngsters know is, for the most part, what they have just learned in law school. This means, all too often, that they are imbued with the prevailing prejudices of their peers. Journalists do tend to be impressed by such "stars"; but, then, journalists in this country do not tend to be well-educated.
The clerks, as presented in The Brethren-in other words, the clerks as they allowed themselves to be quoted and described-come through as presumptuous and arrogant. Hence, they are unable to see or to report serious matters properly. Much of one's interest in this investigation collapses if one is not very much concerned with or impressed by the opinions, dismay, and anger of inexperienced youth. The most vehement moral judgments reported to have been expressed in the Supreme Court Building are, it seems, primarily those of the clerks. The Justices, when they express moral judgments, it also seems, do so primarily upon the prodding of their clerks. 31 One must wonder how Justices get where they are without their clerks to show them the way! But, then, one must not make too much of law clerks. That should be left to Mr. Woodward and Mr. Armstrong. The decisive comment here may be that of Justice Rehnquist, who had himself been a law clerk in his youth: he called the "bad mouthing" of the Chief Justice that he heard in his own chambers "sport for law clerks." '32 Several reviewers have been reminded of Hegel's observation that no man is a hero to his valet, not because the master may not be a hero, but because the other is a valet. ("What great ones do, the less will prattle of.
... ).
Consider, also, the advice given by Leo Strauss:
It is safer to try to understand the low in the light of the high than the high in the light of It has been suggested by one law professor that the authors of The Brethren "simply do not understand the concept of noble politics." Fletcher, supra note 29, at 179. It is sometimes said that since the Supreme Court exercises considerable political influence these days, it is proper that V.
JOURNALISM AND THE LAW I have suggested that a certain moral stature is needed if one is to deal properly with moral questions. Similarly, a certain intellectual competence is needed if one is to deal properly with legal and constitutional questions.
The Brethren tells us more that is significant about journalism-its interests, standards, and limitations-than about the Supreme Court. It is often instructive to see how someone understands what and how other people understand.
The limitations of journalists should be evident to the careful reader of the press. They are notoriously inadequate when they report what courts do. This is partly because they usually do not (or cannot) do the homework required, and partly because they deal only with the occasional controversial case, and then only at the last minute when a decision is announced. Journalists do not have a reliable sense of what is routine in the law; nor do they study opinions carefully. Even when they do read the current opinion being reported, they usually do not know much about the critical opinions that preceded the one immediately under consideration.
34
its personnel and its deliberations should now be subjected to the same kind of scrutiny to which other political bodies are subject in this country. Of course, the Court has always been somewhat political in its effect. But, putting that aside, is there any reason to believe that the Court will do as well as it can the things that only the judiciary can do, if it s routinely subjected to the kind of prying that The Brethren represents? The Court's effectiveness seems to depend, in part, on the respect it enjoys as somehow above immediate political squabbles--a respect that a certain kind of journalism can thoughtlessly undermine. Furthermore, one must wonler whether the wrong things are all too often investigated about personnel in the other branches of government as well. If the press is going to fulfill what Mr. Justice Brennan calls its "partnership" with the Court, the new reporting dimensions will have to come from that part of the press which is printed. So, I asked Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong what they thought should be done. For a start, they agree with constitutional lawyers that the kind of narrow reporting necessitated by deadline pressures is woefully inadequate. "There should be more thematic coverage," says Woodward. That is, extensive pieces exploring a basic constitutional issue-abortion, police searches, school library censorship-by connecting cases already decided with those on the way up to the Court. And the reporters should be steeped in the material. You don't need a law degree, from Yale or anywhere else, to be illuminating on these matters. It just takes a lot of reading, interviewing and clear writing.
in what is curious and unusual. 35 They tend to be unreliable: a lawyer or a politician is, I am afraid, more apt to keep a promise than is an editor. This is perhaps, in part, because the journalist is so much surer than a lawyer or a politician is apt to be that he is on the side of the angels. Journalists tend to be unaware of their inadequacies. Thus, a patronizing tone is evident throughout this book. 36 One consequence of these authors' limitations is that they can inadvertently hurt those whom they want to help: in some ways, the Justices who come off worst in this book are (besides Chief Justice Burger) Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, those whom the authors evidently hold (along with Chief Justice Warren and Justice Black) in the highest esteem.
Truly, it can be said of these authors that they know not what they do. One of the things these authors do is jeopardize future relations among the Justices. The authors indicate in their introduction that "It's very important," Woodward adds, "for the press to be more than retrospective in its coverage. It should enter the debate before the Justices make up their minds." "Do they read newspapers much?" I asked. "Oh boy, do they," Woodward answered. "They all do. And from what we saw, some Justices get through more of their newspapers than they do all the petitions for reviews that come to them. As Brennan said at Rutgers, they need the press to tell them what's going on out there in the nation. Don't forget, we're talking about nine elderly men, five of them over 70. All of them white, except for Marshall, and all of them male. They're isolated ... they do not consider current cases, lest they affect their outcome. But they are not as careful about current Justices as they claim to be about current cases. The consequences of public revelations about what the Justices think of each other are evident from the book itself. 3 8 We should be reminded of the effect upon Justice Black when he learned what Chief Justice Stone had "really" thought of him. Yet, the authors do not act on what they report, but rather publish cruel, or at least callous, comments supposedly made by the Justices about one another. Are they not aware of what they are doing? Or is it that they have done a lot of work digging up these barbs, filtered for the most part through the psyches and vocabularies of unprincipled law clerks, and want to profit from their work? One can be sure that the Justices soon located the references to themselves in The Brethren .39 Many of the comments by their colleagues were no doubt laughed off. But some of them will rankle. In a few cases, personal and professional relations may be permanently affected. 40 The authors recognize that there is a tradition among the Court of "complimenting the 'learned Judge' before ripping him to shreds." And they recognize also the purpose of this practice: "The tradition help[s] keep disputes on an impersonal plane, or at least maintain[s] the facade that battles [are] legal and not to be taken personally." 4 1 Nevertheless, the authors can report that on one occasion a Justice hurriedly left the scene, lest he burst out laughing at the foolishness of a colleague. 42 Both Justices, whose names are given, are still on the Court. Does it serve a useful purpose to have one Justice learn that another found him laughable? This is a mild illustration. Much harsher instances could be cited. 43 One need not believe that the Court is entitled to extraordinary consideration in order to recognize that there is something dubious about this sort of thing. One does not seepublished such contemporary assessments of members of Congress or of members of the press by 38. See Mr. Armstrong has been reported as saying, "It's not going to change the Justices' relationships. These guys already know what they think about each other." TIME, Dec. 17, 1979, at 79. This assumes that it does not matter whether another's private opinion about oneself is published or not. their colleagues, even though comparable information is available, and even though members of Congress or members of the press do not depend as much as the Justices do on being able to work together intimately and for years at a time.
All this reminds us of a question that is vital to our republican regime, and that is whether we can control through social (not legal) institutions the passions we are subject to. Developing such control is a special problem for intellectuals, especially because they have been led by the Enlightenment to believe that the truth cannot do any harm, that exposure of everything that public figures say and do is almost a public duty. 44 We are told in The Brethren of a Justice who withdrew his name from consideration for the position of Chief Justice. Why had he done so? -Because, it is reported by the authors, he "had a private matter that might be embarassing"-not a scandal or anything improper, but a difficulty in his family. His wife had a drinking problem. Would that come out if he were nominated? Was it fair to his family? Would he have to wonder whether his private business might appear in the newspapers, if only in a gossip column? 45 He did not have to worry; it would not appear in a gossip column. Instead, it was put by suppos- To resume, in a few words, the system of the Imperial government, as it was instituted by Augustus, and maintained by those princes who understood their own interest and that of the people, it may be defined as an absolute monarchy disguised by the forms of a commonwealth. The masters of the Roman world surrounded their throne with darkness, concealed their irresistible strength, and humbly professed themselves the accountable ministers of the senate, whose supreme decrees they dictated and obeyed. Consider, also, the observation by Otto von Bismarck: "The less people know about how sausages and laws are made, the better they'll sleep at night. Something of the Enlightenment may be seen in such comments as this: "It is to the credit of Woodward and Armstrong that they were willing-and able--to shatter this conspiracy of silence. It is certainly in the highest tradition of investigative journalism to expose the realities of institutions that affect our lives as greatly as the Supreme Court does." Dershowitz, Book Review, SAT. REV., Mar. 1, 1980, at 37, 42; see also Kirsch, Publish andBe Damned, NEW WEST, July 2, 1979, at 32.
On the limits of enlightenment, see G. ANASTAPLO, supra note 9, at 278-8 1; Anastaplo, The Religion Clauses ofthe First Amendment, 11 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 151 (1981); see also supra note 13.
45. THE BRETHREN, supra note 1, at 16.
edly conscientious authors and publishers in a best seller for the whole country to read! 4 6
How does one understand such obtuseness on the part of these authors? How does one assess a profession which can nurture, reward, and cherish such professionals? After all, these men have long been associated with one of the finest newspapers in the country. What understanding of things legal, moral, and political do these journalists have, that they can risk sowing devastation as they do? Is not something wrong with their training, with the tastes of their respectable readers, and with the education of the eminently successful young lawyers whom they draw upon as their principal sources? Perhaps. we should be grateful that we are hereby again reminded so dramatically of some of the things that are questionable about the brightest and best among us. 47 We are reminded as well-and this may be far more important-of the intellectual limitations and moral pitfalls of legal realism.
VI. THE BPETHREN ON PARTICULAR CASES
A thorough review of The Brethren should include an assessment of what is said about some of the Supreme Court cases which are described at length by the authors. Such an assessment would throw further light on the intellectual equipment and the moral standards of legal scholars and journalists such as these authors.
The book describes cases dealing with busing orders in segregation matters, cases dealing with abortion, and cases dealing with the death penalty. 48 The authors' positions here are the conventional liberal 46 . President Nixon, when he talked with this Justice about the position of Chief Justice, did not seek or receive such information. Id at 17. This Justice has published the following letter:
When I went to see President Richard M. Nixon in April 1969 to ask him not to consider me for Chief Justice, my wife had been a complete teetotaler for more than six years. She still is. My purpose in writing is to make clear that my wife had no "problem" that affected my decision. NEWSWEEK, Dec. 13, 1979, at 7.
At one point in the panel discussion referred to, supra notes II and 12, Mr. Armstrong, in commenting upon this episode, spoke of the Justice's "concern for his wife's health." Apparently, Mr. Armstrong knows how to be discreet when he wants to be. Would not such a reference have sufficed in the book, assuming both that there was a basis for it and that it was in the public interest to mention it? (At another point in the panel discussion, however, Mr. Armstrong referred to this episode, as well as to the episode referred to, supra text accompanying note 12, with less sensitivity. and that a reasonable man can find merit in a community's conscientious use of the death penalty. 49 Similarly, the authors are always clear about what the correct answer is in obscenity cases. 5 0 The danger to freedom of speech and to the discussion of political issues, posed at this time by direct suppression, is magnified by them. They do not see that freedom of speech may be undermined if character is corrupted and if permissiveness and lack of discipline should prevail. 5 1 They are quite self-righteous here, seemingly unaware that citizens dedicated to constitutional government may also want and need a healthy moral community.
Particularly revealing is the assumption that, of course, freedom of speech should permit an entrepreneur to display on an outdoor movie screen, for an entire neighborhood to see, what he chooses to show "inside" to consenting customers, even though the material thus displayed was not so long ago reserved for the most intimate privacy. 5 2 I say that this is "particularly revealing" because the aggressively intrusive outdoor movie screen is a fitting symbol of what the authors themselves do in this book.
Finally, it would be useful to examine at length the authors' treatment of the Watergate tapes controversy. The authors are so intent on showing how Chief Justice Burger had to be corralled by his colleagues in the disposition of that controversy, that they do not properly notice how well the Justices did work together. 5 Space does not permit further discussion of the busing, abortion, death penalty, and obscenity cases dealt with in The Brethren. I can only suggest that such cases are more complicated than these authors believe, and that the authors' superficial grasp of the issues makes it difficult for them to see and report properly what the Court did in these cases. 55 
VII. THE BRETHPEN AND THE _FINAL DAYS
Nor does space permit an extended discussion of still another problem raised in the book, and that is how the entire Watergate controversy (not just the tapes issue) is to be regarded. 56 Was the political trauma we were subjected to for several years good for us? Was it not a nonviolent equivalent of the Kennedy assassination, from which we have yet to recover fully? 57 There is Homeric tragedy in the mess at The Washington Post. The newspaper that led in the exposure of the Watergate scandal wears a black armband these days.
The Post has returned a Pulitzer Prize awarded to a young reporter who wrote a story about an eight-year-old heroin junkie and now has admitted it was fiction.
Some feeble effort was put forth to say that her story was a composite. That seems even more unnerving to some of us who have always suspected that "Deep Throat," the same newspaper's informant in the Watergate scandal, was a composite source. 60. Walter F. Murphy, in the panel discussion referred to, supra notes I I and 12, observed that Mr. Woodward had earned a national reputation by writing about a burglary; then he himself made use of a burglary for his next book. That is, Mr. Murphy explained, Justice Brennan had shown him signs of a burglary of his office at the Court from which papers had been stolen. Mr. Armstrong responded that every person who had given them documents had had authorized access to them. (How could he know this? Does he not depend here on the integrity of his informants?) He observed that Mr. Woodward and he were not aware of any burgled document having been made available to them. The recent publication in the press of substantial excerpts from a dramatic book on "the final days" of the Nixon Administration should remind us how much Richard M. Nixon has contributed to the corruption of the American people, so much so that it has become virtually impossible for us to deal fairly with him. The passions he shamelessly exploited and aroused have evidently made it impossible for us to maintain a sense of proportion with respect to him. There is something about the man which does bring out the worst in us.
We should have been, for his good as well as ours, far more critical of Mr. Nixon on his way up-and far more compassionate toward him on his way down. I myself particularly regret that some of those who have enjoyed their hot pursuit of Mr. Nixon in recent years were not available to help us "contain" him and his allies a generation ago-at a time when constitutional government in the United States was truly threatened.
The measure of our corruption may be se~r not only in the extent and brutality of the public probing into the isyches and intimate relations of Mr. Nixon and those around him but also in the general assumption that the press is entitled (if not even obliged) to expose to immediate view the various episodes we have had thrust upon us. Conscientious publishers and editors now seem trapped by practices and expectations which permit, if they do not even demand, more and more uninhibited delving into what would once have been thought to be strictly private matters. At the same time, the harassment of Daniel Schorr for his handling (as a reporter) of classified documents is inadequately challenged by the press. There has been for me personally, in the recent sensationalized exposures of Mr. Nixon and his associates, something of the shock I experienced in 1969 as a spectator during those grim days of the Chicago Conspiracy Trial when a self-righteous judge was permitted to bind and gag a defendant before our very eyes. In such matters, the aberrations of a particular man (whether a judge or an author or an editor) are not as significant as the fact that he is allowed by a careless community to behave as he does.
The self-governing community grounded in decency and a sense of fair play is one which lets it be known, in an authoritative manner, "We cannot have that!" The principal safeguard to be relied upon in keeping the press in line is not official censorship or prosecution but It should also be evident from what has been said in this article thatpart of the trouble with The Brethren is that Mr. Woodward and Mr. Armstrong were simply "taken in" by some immature but plausible law clerks. One consequence of an indulgence by journalists and their readers in "personalities" is that substantive issues tend to be neglected, those issues which one cannot help but be primarily concerned with when there are only the Court's published opinions to be studied. See supra notes 2, 17. Richard Strout, the venerable journalist, has counseled that the "press isn't what it should be. I think we tend to deal with sensations and accidents and trivialities." R. Brownstein & N. Easton, Permanent Washington, EsQUIRE, Sept. 1983, at 45, 54; See also the report on David Broder, id at 51, where he is quoted as distinguishing between "newsy items" that "may be the gist of political talk at New York cocktail parties" and analyses which explain "how elections really work." rather the guidance of an informed and firm public opinion, that vigilant guidance which in turn depends upon the sensitivity and prudence of those who shape and monitor public opinion.
It would, on the other hand, be foolish to insist that there is nothing useful to be learned from "inside" accounts of the last days of the Nixon Administration, even when those accounts have been distorted for commercial exploitation. One can confirm, for example, that the power of a President is severely limited by the men upon whom he necessarily depends, so much so that things are seldom as bad (or, for that matter, as good) as they may seem from the outside.
But, the problem remains, what price have we had to pay for whatever useful information we have received? For one thing, we have had ratified for us by the recent revelations still another set of unprecedented infringements upon personal privacy, and in such a way as to whet the public appetite for much more of the same. The vindictive probings and destructive redbaiting of the House UnAmerican Activities Committee, which Mr. Nixon encouraged and profited from a generation ago, sometimes seem rather tame by comparison with that which has been done to him and his associates in recent years. Certainly, the domestic Communist conspiracy seemed to me as exaggerated then as the threat to constitutional government and civil liberties now said to have been posed by the Nixon Administration.
However that may be, human anguish and a sense of helplessness, as well as a pervasive vulgarity, all too often result from the kind of callous journalism to which we have become accustomed. We will, unless we make deliberate efforts to reconsider our principles and to retrain our appetites, deteriorate even further in these respects-and we run the risk as well of an eventual unthinking reaction which takes the form of a dangerous suppression of freedom of the press. No doubt, the common good may occasionally call for such painful exposures as we have recently seen. But does not our current addiction to the political gossip which we reward so lavishly deprive us of serious political discourse? Such gossip-an indulgence in political pornography-is an unhealthy diversion from that vital discussion of public issues for which our freedom of the press is primarily intended.
This diversion has meant, among other things, that the genuine accomplishments, as well as the inevitable failures, of the Nixon Administration are not likely to be properly appreciated for another generation. Thus, our growing concern with trivia, including the trivia of Mr. Nixon's complex psyche and of the mechanics of the ouster of a President, has prevented us from making the sensible assessment we require and are entitled to make if we are to understand and (if need be) to correct what really happened during that unfortunate Presidency.
I have discussed elsewhere the reservations I have had about the way the ruthless campaign for Mr. Nixon's impeachment was con-of the community are thereby catered to. I am reminded of the Athenian multitude which shouted, whenever they were deprived of anything by customs and laws, that it would be terrible if the people should not be permitted to do whatever they wished. 64 It is well, in this connection, to be reminded of what was said in 1979 at a St. John's College memorial service for a prudent refugee to this country:
[H]e was concerned for the land of his refuge. What troubled him has been called many things: pseudo-sophistication, permissiveness, moral decline. His own way of putting it was much simpler, barbarism and, most dangerous of all for America, hedonism. What seemed to bother him was the fact that when people cease to observe and impose limits on themselves, it becomes natural to think more about having limits imposed by others from above. 65 We can be grateful to our not uninteresting authors that they have reminded us of the constant need we Americans have to impose limits upon ourselves, and especially to curb by the moralforce of an informed public opinion those who would cater to our baser desires. We should take care, in our responses to the opinion-makers of our day, that we not permit a cheap realism to be substituted for a noble awareness.
